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Abstract. Trust management and trustworthy computing are becoming increas-
ingly significant at present. Over the recent years there have been several research
works that have addressed the issue of trust management in distributed systems.
However a clear and comprehensive definition that can be used to capture a range
of commonly understood notions of trust is still lacking. In this paper, we give
a formal definition of trust relationship with a strict mathematical structure that
can not only reflect many of the commonly used extreme notions of trust but also
provides a taxonomy framework where a range of useful trust relationships can
be expressed and compared. Then we show how the proposed structure can be
used to analyze both commonly used and some unique trust notions that arise in
distributed environments. This proposed trust structure is currently being used in
the development of the overall methodology of life cycle of trust relationships in
distributed information systems.
1 Introduction
The concept of trust has been used and studied in social science for a long time [1,
2]. Trust was originally used in human and social issues in day-life relationships, laws,
regulations and policies. In the computing world, the trust was originally used in the
context of trusted computing such as trusted system, trusted hardware and trusted soft-
ware [3]. Recently, trust has been used in the context of trust management in distributed
computing [4–7]. When the Internet and web technologies are broadly and increasingly
used in daily life for electronic commerce, trust becomes a very hot topic [8, 9]. The
trust between customers and e-vendors includes not only technical aspects but also so-
cial aspects. In this paper, we will provide our definition of trust relationship. Most of
the issues relating to social aspects of trust is beyond the scope of this paper, but we
hope that our general definition of trust relationship can cover both aspects. The trust
relationships of involved entities or computing components in distributed computing
are our major concern.
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XML-based Web Services technologies have been rapidly evolving since 1999. Web
Services technologies address the challenges of distributed computing and B2B integra-
tion. There are huge number of service oriented applications on the Internet and they are
coupled loosely. Web Services technologies target at loosely-coupled, language-neutral
and platform-independent way of linking applications for business process automation
within organizations, across enterprizes, and across the Internet. There is no centralized
control and the users are not all predetermined. Normally, the computing components
involved in a e-service can belong to different security domains and there is no com-
mon trusted authority for the involved entities. How to define/model trust relationships
between computing components is an important and challenging issue in the design of
web services. The draft of WS-Trust was proposed in 2002 [10]. Unfortunately, the cur-
rent WS-Trust only touches the issue of trusted message exchange and has not provided
more details for dealing with trust relationships.
Many researchers have recognized the trust management as a distinct and important
component of security in distributed systems. Several automated trust management sys-
tems have been proposed such as PolicyMaker[4], KeyNote[5, 6], and REFEREE [7].
In all these trust management systems, trust and its related concepts are assumed in a
specific way relating to the specific topics. There is no consensus on the definition of
trust. In PolicyMaker and KeyNote, M. Blaze et al provided clear definition of trust
management system and there are many clues to understand what is trust but they did
not comment on the concept of trust directly. In REFEREE, Y. H. Chu et al described
trust as “to trust is to undertake a potentially dangerous operation knowing that it is
potentially dangerous”. Tyrone et al [11] gave a definition of trust as “the firm belief in
the competence of an entity to act dependably, securely, and reliably within a specified
context”. Y. H. Chu et al and Tyrone et al talked about trust in a kind of general terms,
however trust is difficult to express without a strict mathematical structure. In Policy-
Maker, KeyNote and REFEREE, a new trust management layer has been successfully
built but the concept of trust and how to model trust has not been considered carefully.
It is necessary to have a solid understanding of the concept of trust relationship and to
develop a powerful set of tools to model the trust relationships for trust management in
distributed information systems.
The starting point of this research is trust in the context of distributed environments.
Here we have not separated the traditional distributed computing and the Web Services.
Web Services are included when we talk about distributed computing for the consider-
ation of trust issues.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we give the definition
of trust relationship and discuss some extreme cases. In section 3, we give a series
of definitions, propositions and operations about trust relationships. The mathematical
properties of trust relationships are embedded in these definitions, propositions and op-
erations. In section 4, we provide two scenario examples of trust relationships and we
give some analysis of trust relationships using the definitions, propositions and opera-
tions in section 3. In section 5, we provide concluding remarks.
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2 Definition of Trust Relationship
Most of the researchers agree that a trust relationship is the relationship between a set of
trusters and a set of trustees in a specified context, but it is not clear enough, especially
when it is used in the computing world. There is a need to convert the generally used
terms into strict mathematical structure in algorithms of real systems. In this paper, we
will provide our definition of trust relationship with a strict mathematical structure.
In trust management of distributed information systems, we believe that the defini-
tion of trust should have the following characteristics:
– The definition of trust is unique and can be used for different computing purposes.
– The definition of trust has strong expressive power and makes the system as simple
as possible.
– The definition of trust has a strict mathematical structure.
– The definition of trust provides the solid foundation for discussing the properties of
trust relationships.
– The definition of trust follows hard security mechanisms.
Hard security assumes complete certainty and it allows complete access or no access at
all. Here we only model the static status of trust in distributed environments.
We believe that it is not enough to understand trust as a simple bilateral relation
between trusters and trustees. The whole syntax of trust relationship should be “under
a set of specified conditions, a set of trusters trust that a set of trustees have a set of
specified properties (the set of trustees will/can perform a set of actions or have a set of
attributes)”. The definition is expressed as follows:
Definition 1 A trust relationship is a four-tuple T =< R, E, C, P > where:
– R is the set of trusters. It contains all the involved trusters. It can not be empty.
– E is the set of trustees. It contains all the involved trustees. It can not be empty.
– C is the set of conditions. It contains all conditions (requirements) for the current
trust relationship. Normally, trust relationship has some specified conditions. If
there is no condition, the condition set is empty.
– P is the set of properties. The property set describes the actions or attributes of the
trustees. It can not be empty. The property set can be divided into two sub sets:
• Action set: the set of actions what trusters trust that trustees will/can perform.
• Attribute set: the set of attributes what trusters trust that trustees have.
Anywhere, a trust relationship must be used with full syntax(four-tuple< R, E, C, P >.
Trust relationship T means that under the condition set C, truster set R trust that trustee
set E have property set P . There are some extreme cases of the trust relationship when
some involved sets included nothing(empty set) or anything(whole set of possible enti-
ties). The extreme cases have special meanings and are crucial in the understanding of
the definition of trust relationship. These extreme cases will play important roles in the
real world. The followings are the five extreme cases of trust relationship:
1. R is ANY . Truster set includes all possible entities. All possible entities trust that
the set of trustees E have the set of properties P under the set of conditions C.
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2. E is ANY . Trustee set includes all possible entities. All possible entities can be
trusted to have the set of properties P by the set of trusters R under the set of
conditions C.
3. C is EMPTY . There is no condition in the trust relationship. The set of trusters R
trust that the set of trustees E have the set of properties P without any condition.
4. P is ANY . The property of the trustee can be anything. The set of trusters R trust
that the set of trustees E have all possible properties under the set of conditions C.
5. C is EMPTY and P is ANY . The set of trusters R trust that the set of trustees E
have all possible properties without any condition. This case happens when the set
of trusters R trust the set of trustees E by default.
When the full syntax of the trust relationship is not used, trust relationship is easily
misunderstood. Normally, there are many implicit assumptions and some parts of full
syntax are usually omitted. When we analyze the true meaning of a trust relationship,
the full syntax must be recovered. Our definition of the trust relationship has strict
mathematical structure with the full syntax in any case. There is no confusion when the
full syntax trust relationship is used in any information system.
It is straightforward to use the set of conditions in the definition of trust relationship.
When a trust relationship is used, trusters, trustees and properties are normally involved
individually. The trust relationship can always be evaluated based on one truster, one
trustee and one property. In our definition of trust relationship, the trusters, trustees
and properties turn up as sets are based on the following concerns (1) The concept of
security domain is broadly used and related technologies are quite mature. The role-
based access control is broadly used and well understood by programmers and business
people. When a set of trusters, a set of trustees and a set of properties are used in the def-
inition of trust relationship, the similar ideas in security domain and role-based access
control can be employed easily. It is convenient to define some abstraction character-
istics based on a group of trusters, a group of trustees and a group of properties. We
hope that a set of trusters, a set of trustees and a set of properties in the definition of
the trust relationship have better abstraction and it is easier to use the definition. (2)
The set theory can provide formal mathematical notion and handy tools to discuss the
relationships of sets. (3) An individual truster (or trustee, or property) is a special case
of the set of trusters (or trustees, or properties). (4) It is convenient to discuss special
cases of trust relationship when truster (or trustee, or property) is anyone.
3 Mathematical Properties of Trust Relationships
In this paper, we will discuss the mathematical properties of trust relationship based on
our strict definition of trust relationship. The trust relationship has a full syntax with
truster set, trustee set, condition set and property set. It is incorrect to only talk about
the trust relationship between trusters and trustees without mention of the condition set
and property set. The discussions of properties of trust relationship should be based on
the full syntax of trust relationship in its definition. In the following part of this section,
we will give some definitions, propositions and operations related to trust relationships.
The mathematical properties of trust relationships are embedded in these definitions,
propositions and operations. These mathematical properties focus on some relations of
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trust relationships and they will be used as tools in the analysis and design of trust
relationships in real systems.
From the nature of trust relationship and its mathematical structure, some new trust
relationships can be derived based on the existing trust relationships. In the follows,
we will define the operations of using two existing trust relationships to generate a new
trust relationship under specific constraints and operations of decomposing one existing
trust relationship into two new trust relationships under specific constraints.
Operation 1 Let T1 = (R1, E1, C1, P1) and T2 = (R2, E2, C2, P2). There is a
set T = (R1 ∩ R2, E1 ∩ E2, C1 ∪ C2, P1 ∪ P2). If R1 ∩ R2 = ∅ or E1 ∩ E2 = ∅,
T = ∅.
If R1 = R2 and E1 = E2, the operation becomes:
Operation 1A Let T1 = (R, E, C1, P1) and T2 = (R, E, C2, P2). There is
a set T = (R, E, C1 ∪ C2, P1 ∪ P2).
If R1 = R2, E1 = E2 and C1 = C2, the operation becomes:
Operation 1B Let T1 = (R, E, C, P1) and T2 = (R, E, C, P2). Then there
is a set T = (R, E, C, P1 ∪ P2).
Operation 2 Let T1 = (R1, E1, C, P ) and T2 = (R2, E2, C, P ). There is a set
T = (R1 ∪ R2, E1 ∩ E2, C, P ).
If E1 = E2, the operation becomes:
Operation 2A Let T1 = (R1, E, C, P ) and T2 = (R2, E, C, P ). There is a
set T = (R1 ∪ R2, E, C, P ).
Operation 3 Let T1 = (R1, E1, C, P ) and T2 = (R2, E2, C, P ). There is a set
T = (R1 ∩ R2, E1 ∪ E2, C, P ).
If R1 = R2, the operation becomes:
Operation 3A Let T1 = (R, E1, C, P ) and T2 = (R, E2, C, P ). There is a
set T = (R, E1 ∪ E2, C, P ).
Operation 4 Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If there are R1, R2 and R = R1 ∪ R2, then
there are trust relationships T1 =< R1, E, C, P > and T2 =< R2, E, C, P >.
Operation 5 Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If there are E1, E2 and E = E1 ∪E2, then
there are trust relationships T1 =< R, E1, C, P > and T2 =< R, E2, C, P >.
Operation 6 Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If there are P1, P2 and P = P1 ∪ P2, then
there are trust relationships T1 =< R, E, C, P1 > and T2 =< R, E, C, P2 >.
This operation has the following special case:
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Operation 6A Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If there are P1, P2, C1, C2 and P =
P1 ∪ P2, C = C1 ∪ C2, then there are trust relationships T1 =< R, E, C1, P1 >
and T2 =< R, E, C2, P2 >.
All operations can be used to generate new trust relationships from the existing trust
relationships under some specific constrains. The Operation 1 deals with any two trust
relationships and a new trust relationship is possibly generated(if the result is not ∅).
The Operation 1A, 1B, 2A, 3A deal with how to use two trust relationships to gener-
ate one trust relationship under some specific constraints. The Operation 4, 5, 6 and
6A deal with how to decompose one trust relationship into two trust relationships un-
der some specific constraints. Operation 1A and Operation 6A are inverse operations.
Operation 1B and Operation 6 are inverse operations. Operation 2A and Operation
4 are inverse operations. Operation 3A and Operation 5 are inverse operations.
In the following part of this section, we will focus on the relation of trust relation-
ships, especially we will discuss and define the equivalent, primitive, derived, direct
redundant and alternate trust relationships. We will classify the direct redundant trust
relationships into different types as well.
Definition 2 Let T1 =< R1, E1, C1, P1 > and T2 =< R2, E2, C2, P2 >. If and
only if R1 = R2 and E1 = E2 and C1 = C2 and P1 = P2, then T1 and T2 are
equivalent, in symbols:
T1 = T2 ⇐⇒ R1 = R2 and E1 = E2 and C1 = C2 and P1 = P2
Definition 3 If a trust relationship can not be derived from other existing trust rela-
tionships, the trust relationship is a primitive trust relationship.
Definition 4 If a trust relationship can be derived from other existing trust relation-
ships, the trust relationship is a derived trust relationship.
Note: Trust relationships are predefined in information systems. A derived trust rela-
tionship is always related to one or more other trust relationships. For an independent
trust relationship, it is meaningless to judge it as a derived trust relationship or not.
Proposition 1 If a derived trust relationship exists, there is information redundancy.
Proof. When the derived trust relationship is moved out of the system, the information
of the derived trust relationship has not been lost. The derived trust relationship can be
built when it is necessary. From the view point of information, there is redundancy.
Definition 5 Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If there is trust relationship T ′ =<
R′, E′, C′, P ′ > and T = T ′, R ⊆ R′, E ⊆ E′, C ⊇ C′, P ⊆ P ′.
T is a direct redundant trust relationship.
In the following part of this section, we discuss several special cases of direct redundant
trust relationships based on the single tuple of trust relationship. We believe that these
special cases play important roles in the analysis and design of trust relationships in
information systems.
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Direct Redundancy Type 1 : DLR-redundant trust relationship
Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If and only if there is a trust relationship T ′ =<
R′, E, C, P > and R′ ⊃ R, T is a DLR-redundant trust relationship.
T is DLR-redundant trust relationship means that there is another trust relationship
with super set of trusters and all other tuples are same as peers in T .
Direct Redundancy Type 2 : DLE-redundant trust relationship
Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If and only if there is a trust relationship T ′ =<
R, E′, C, P > and E′ ⊃ E, T is a DLE-redundant trust relationship.
T is DLE-redundant trust relationship means that there is another trust relationship
with super set of trustees and all other tuples are same as peers in T .
Direct Redundancy Type 3 : DMC-redundant trust relationship
Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If and only if there is an alternate trust relationship
T ′ =< R, E, C′, P > and C′ ⊂ C, T is a DMC-redundant trust relationship.
T is DMC-redundant trust relationship means that there is another trust relationship
with sub set of conditions and all other tuples are same as peers in T .
Direct Redundancy Type 4 : DLP-redundant trust relationship
Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If and only if there is a trust relationship T ′ =<
R, E, C, P ′ > and P ′ ⊃ P , T is a DLP-redundant trust relationship.
T is DLP-redundant trust relationship means that there is another trust relationship
with super set of properties and all other tuples are same as peers in T .
Definition 6 Let T =< R, E, C, P >, T ′ =< R, E, C′, P > and C = C′. T
and T ′ are alternate trust relationships of each other.
An alternate trust relationship means that there is an alternate condition set for the same
truster set, trustee set and property set. Perhaps, there are multiple alternate trust re-
lationships. In distributed computing, multiple mechanisms and multiple choices are
necessary in many situations and it is the main reason why we define and discuss alter-
nate trust relationship here.
Proposition 2 If T is a DMC-redundant trust relationship, there is one or more than
one alternate trust relationships which are not DMC-redundant trust relationship.
Proof. If T is a DMC-redundant trust relationship, there is T ′ =< R, E, C′, P >
and C′ ⊂ C. T ′ is an alternate trust relationship of T . If T ′ is not DMC-redundant
trust relationship, the proposition is proved. If T ′ is a DMC-redundant trust relation-
ship, the next T ′′ can be found, T ′′ =< R, E, C′′, P > with C′′ ⊂ C′. Such
a process will continue until the set of conditions includes minimum number of con-
ditions. In every turn of the process, one or more conditions are removed from the
condition set. Because C contains limited conditions, the process can finish when no
condition can be removed from the condition set. The final set of conditions is Cf .
T f =< R, E, Cf , P > is an alternate trust relationship with non-redundant condi-
tions.
A DMC-redundant trust relationship may have multiple alternate trust relationships
with different sets of non-redundant conditions.
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4 Scenario Examples of Trust Relationships
In this section, we make up two scenarios for discussing trust relationships in the real
world. We hope that these examples can be helpful in understanding the definition of
trust relationship and mathematical properties of trust relationships expressed in section
2 and section 3.
Scenario 1: When people want to change their names, they need to apply to a spe-
cific organization (In Australia, the organization is the Registry of Birth Deaths & Mar-
riages). The officers in the organization and the requesters are involved in this scenario.
Using the full syntax of our definition of trust relationship, some trust relationships may
be modelled as follows:
TS1- 1 Officers trust requesters if requesters have their Birth Certificate & Driver’s
Licence that requesters have the right for the change.
TS1- 2 Officers trust requesters if requesters have their Citizenship Certificate &
Driver’s Licence that requesters have the right for the change.
TS1- 3 Officers trust requesters if requesters have their Birth Certificate & Citizenship
Certificate & Driver’s Licence that requesters have the right for the change.
If TS1-1, TS1-2 and TS1-3 are all the trust relationships in this information system,
based on the definitions and operations in section 3, we can have the following analysis:
– TS1-1 and TS1-2 are primitive trust relationships.
– TS1-1 and TS1-2 are alternate trust relationships of each other.
– TS1-3 is a derived trust relationship which can be derived by Operation 1A with
TS1-1 and TS1-2.
– TS1-3 is a DMC-redundant trust relationship and it should be removed out of the
system.
Scenario 2: An online e-commerce service is called FlightServ which can provide flight
booking and travel deals. FlightServ is designed based on the new technologies of web
services. FlightServ connects with customers, airlines, hotels and credit card services
(some of them maybe web services). The whole system could be very complicated, but
we only consider some of trust relationships in the system. In the system, customers are
classified into normal flyers and frequent flyers. Originally, some trust relationships are
modelled as:
TS2- 1 Airlines trust normal flyers if they have address details & confirmed credit card
information that normal flyers can make their airline bookings.
TS2- 2 Airlines trust frequent flyers with no condition that frequent flyers can make
their airline bookings.
TS2- 3 Hotels trust normal flyers if they have address details & confirmed credit card
information that normal flyers can make their hotels booking.
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TS2- 4 Hotels trust frequent flyers if they have address details & confirmed credit card
information that frequent flyers can make their hotels booking.
TS2- 5 Credit card services are trusted by all possible entities without any condition
that the credit card services will give the correct evaluation of credit card information.
TS2- 6 Credit card services are trusted by all possible entities without any condition
that the credit card services will keep the privacy of credit card information.
For the above trust relationships in the system, based on definitions and operations in
section 3, we have the following analysis:
– All above trust relationships are primitive.
– Using the Operation 3A, trust relationships TS2-3 and TS2-4 can be merged to
a new trust relationship TS2-(3)(4): “Hotels trust customers if they have address
details & confirmed credit card information that customers can make their hotels
booking”. If TS2-(3)(4) has been defined in the system, TS2-3 and TS2-4 becomes
DLE-redundant trust relationships and will be removed out of the system.
– Using the Operation 1B, trust relationships TS2-5 and TS2-6 can be merged to a
new trust relationship TS2-(5)(6): “Credit card services are trusted by all possible
entities without any condition that the credit card services will give the correct
evaluation of credit card information & the credit card services will keep the privacy
of credit card information”. If TS2-(5)(6) has been defined in the system, TS2-5 and
TS2-6 becomes DLP-redundant trust relationships and will be removed out of the
system.
Obviously, the definition of trust relationship in section 2 and the mathematical prop-
erties of trust relationships in section 3 provide terminologies and helpful tools in the
analysis of the two scenarios. In the analysis of the two scenarios, we only employ some
definitions, propositions and operations expressed in section 3. We hope that these ex-
amples can provide a general picture for the usage of the definitions, propositions and
operations. In these two scenarios, we only choose some trust relationships as examples
and there are more trust relationships. The systematic methodologies and strategies for
modelling trust relationships are beyond the scope of this paper as well and will be
discussed elsewhere.
5 Concluding Remarks
The definition of the trust relationship provided in this paper has a strict mathemati-
cal structure and broad expressive power. The definition is suitable for any computing
purpose. The mathematical properties of trust relationships are shown in a series of
definitions, propositions and operations. We believe that these definitions and mathe-
matical properties of trust relationships provide useful tools for enabling the analysis,
design and implementation of trust in distributed environments.
This research only provides a starting point for the analysis and design of trust
relationships in distributed information systems. How to model trust relationships in
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distributed information systems and how to merge the trust relationships into the over-
all distributed information systems provides lots of challenges for further research. We
believe that our definition of trust relationship and the associated mathematical proper-
ties described in section 3 could be used as helpful tools to model the trust relationships.
The definitions and operations in section 3 provide some starting points and tools for
the analysis and design of the trust relationships in a system. We are currently working
on using the proposed definition of trust relationship and mathematical properties of
trust relationships to develop a methodology for modelling trust in distributed systems.
This involves several stages such as extracting trust requirements in system, identify-
ing possible trust relationships from trust requirements, choosing the whole set of trust
relationships from possible trust relationships and implementing and maintaining trust
relationships in systems. We will describe them in details in a separate paper.
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